This book is concerned with the study of collective preference, in particular with the relationship between the objectives of social action and the preferences and aspirations of society's members. Professor Sen's approach is based on the assumption that the problem of collective choice cannot be satisfactorily discussed within the confines of economics. While collective choice forms a crucial aspect of economics, the subject pertains also to political science, the theory of the state, and to the theory of decision procedures. The author has therefore used material from these disciplines, plus philosophical aspects from ethics and the theory of justice.
Inhalt
Introduction to the Series
Preface
Chapter 1 Introduction
Chapter 1 Preference Relations
Chapter 2 Unanimity
Chapter 2 Collective Choice Rules and Pareto Comparisons
Chapter 3 Collective Rationality
Chapter 3 Social Welfare Functions
Chapter 4 Choice Versus Orderings
Chapter 4 Social Decision Functions
Chapter 5 Values and Choice
Chapter 5 Anonymity, Neutrality and Responsiveness
Chapter 6 Conflicts and Dilemmas
Chapter 6 The Liberal Paradox
Chapter 7 Interpersonal Aggregation and Comparability
Chapter 7 Aggregation Quasi-Orderings
Chapter 8 Cardinality with or without Comparability
Chapter 8 Bargains and Social Welfare Functions
Chapter 9 Equity and Justice
Chapter 9 Impersonality and Collective Quasi-Orderings
Chapter 10 Majority Choice and Related Systems
Chapter 10 Restricted Preferences and Rational Choice
Chapter 11 Theory and Practice
Bibliography
Indexes
Name Index
Subject Index