The strategic imperative is held as the primary explanation for Pakistan's military buildup. This book presents a fundamental departure in presenting an analysis of the internal dynamics of defence management and decisionmaking in Pakistan - a new nuclear weapon state. This is an in-depth study of Pakistan's security link with its arms suppliers and defence industrial capacity, and the influence of Pakistan's Army on conventional and non-conventional defence decisions. The analysis is backed with numerous case studies of defence decisions carried out from 1979-99.

AYESHA SIDDIQA-AGHA is a freelance researcher and a civil servant. In recognition of her research she was appointed as the Director of Naval Research in the Pakistan Navy, a distinction enjoyed by no other Pakistani academic. Also a Ford Fellow, she has contributed numerous articles and papers in international journals and other publications. Her previous work includes Management of Light Weapons Production in Public and Private Sectors: A View from Pakistan and Curbing the Weapons of Civilian Destruction.

List of Tables List of Figures List of Maps Acknowledgements Preface Foreword Glossary Introduction PART ONE Development of Threat Perception The Official Decisionmaking System Pakistan's Power Politics and Defence Decisionmaking The Cost of Military Buildup Military Industrial Complex PART TWO Military Buildup Decisions, 19779-90 Military Buildup Decisions, 1990-99 Mutually Assured Deterrence: The Nuclear Option Looking Ahead Index Pakistan's Arms Suppliers