What does US aid "buy" in the Middle East? Drawing on extensive primary source research, this book examines the role and consequences of US aid to three countries in the Middle East. The author argues that the political survival strategies of incumbent leaders in Egypt, Israel, and Jordan shaped not only the type of aid that these countries received from the US, but also its developmental and geopolitical impact. Leaders who relied heavily on distributing selective benefits to their ruling coalitions were more likely to receive forms of US aid that complemented their distributive political economies and undermined the state's developmental capacity, which simultaneously rendered them more dependent on US resources, and more likely to cede fragments of their sovereignty to their major donor. Non-distributive leaders, however, could reap the full benefits of highly discretionary and technologically sophisticated aid, incorporating it into developmental policies that rendered them progressively less dependent on Washington-and better able to say "no" when it was in their best interest.

Anne Mariel Zimmermann specializes in comparative political economy and Middle East politics. She was previously Assistant Professor at Wesleyan University, United States, and has also lectured at the University of St. Gallen and the University of Zurich, Switzerland. She received her Ph.D. from the University of Virginia, United States, in 2009.

What does US aid buy in the Middle East? Drawing on extensive primary source research, this book examines the role and consequences of US aid to three countries in the Middle East. The author argues that the political survival strategies of incumbent leaders in Egypt, Israel, and Jordan shaped not only the type of aid that these countries received from the US, but also its developmental and geopolitical impact. Leaders who relied heavily on distributing selective benefits to their ruling coalitions were more likely to receive forms of US aid that complemented their distributive political economies and undermined the state's developmental capacity, which simultaneously rendered them more dependent on US resources, and more likely to cede fragments of their sovereignty to their major donor. Non-distributive leaders, however, could reap the full benefits of highly discretionary and technologically sophisticated aid, incorporating it into developmental policies that rendered them progressively less dependent on Washingtonand better able to say no when it was in their best interest.