Institutional shareholder participation has long been considered as vital to good corporate governance yet its potential does not seem to have been realized particularly in light of the recent banking crises. Drawing on empirical evidence this book analyses institutional shareholders' incentives to see when and why shareholder activism will occur. The book explains the factors that determine institutional shareholders' propensity for activism and applies these finding to both the UK and China in order to explain the varying levels of shareholder activism in each jurisdiction.

Bo Gong is Lecturer in Law at China Central South University, China.

Introduction Part 1: A Model for Shareholder Activism: In Outline 1. A Theoretical Framework for Shareholder Activism Part 2: The Framework of Corporate Governance in the UK and China 2. The Framework of UK Corporate Governance 3. The Framework of Chinese Corporate Governance Part 3: Institutional Shareholder Activism in the UK and China 4. The Landscape of UK Institutional Investment 5. The Landscape of Institutional Investment Part 4: Developing and Applying the Model for Institutional Investor Activism in the UK and China 6. UK Institutional Shareholder Activism: Empirical Evidence 7. Applying the Model to UK Institutional Shareholder Activism 8. Chinese Shareholder Activism: Empirical Evidence 9. Application of the Model in China Part 5: Comparisons and (Modest) Prescriptions for Reform 10. The Way Forward in China: Some Implications from UK Conclusion