Why did financial keiretsu develop in Japan, but not in Germany and the United States? Why is bank intermediation more dominant in Germany and Japan than in the United States? What are the advantages and disadvantages of each system? Capital Markets and Corporate Governance in Japan, Germany and the United States answers these and related questions

Helmut M. Dietl is Professor of Organization and International Management at the University of Paderborn, Germany. He is co-editor of the book series NIE-New Institutional Economics, author of Institutions and Time (in German), and co-author of Organization-An Economic Perspective (in German and Japanese). He has contributed to refereed journals and published in four languages.

Introduction 1 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK Investment relation, Investment relation costs, Relevant dimensions of investment relations, Classification of alternative regulatory environments, Organizational modes of capital allocation and corporate governance, Discriminating match 2 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM GERMANY, JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES Germany, Japan, United States, Conclusion, SUMMARY