Knowledge and Reference in Empirical Science is a fascinating study of the bounds between science and language: in what sense, and of what, does science provide knowledge? Is science an instrument only distantly related to what's real? Can the language of science be used to adequately describe the truth?

In this book, Jody Azziouni investigates the technology of science - the actual forging and exploiting of causal links, between ourselves and what we endeavor to know and understand.

Jody Azzouni is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Tufts University. He is the author of Metaphysical Myths, Mathematical Practice: The Ontology and Epistemology of the Exact Sciences.

Part 1 Procedural Foundationalism; Chapter 1 Introduction to Part I; Chapter 2 Program and Scope; Chapter 3 Reductionism, Confirmation Holism, Theoretical Deductivism; Chapter 4 Some Observations on Reductionism and the "Autonomy" of the Special Sciences; Chapter 5 Some Comments on the Philosophical Implications of the use of Idealizations in Science; Chapter 6 Gross Regularities; Chapter 7 Procedures and Perceptual Procedures; Chapter 8 Shedding Perceptual Procedures; Chapter 9 Conclusion to Part I; Part 2 Two-Tiered Coherentism; Chapter 10 Introduction to Part II; Chapter 11 Evidential Centrality; Chapter 12 OB-Similar Extensions and OB*-Similar Extensions; Chapter 13 OB-Similarity, Observational Regularities, Reasons for Incommensurability; Chapter 14 Kuhnian Considerations and the Accumulation of Knowledge; Chapter 15 Perceptual Impermeability and Biotechnical Incommensurability; Chapter 16 Methodological Observations about Epistemology, Scepticism, and Truth; Part 3 Permuting Reference; Chapter 17 Introduction to Part III; Chapter 18 Formal Considerations; Chapter 19 Quine's Version; Chapter 20 ), I don't know if Field still holds the views of his publication, where I draw his argument from.Field () apparently responds to an unpublished earlier version of Wallace (), where a permutation argument is also presented. But I'm concerned only with how Field () uses permutations to support his conventionalist thesis.; Chapter 21 Putnam's Version; Chapter 22 The Ontological Status of Causality; Chapter 23 Some Puzzles about Reference; Chapter 24 Conclusion to Part III; Part 4 The Transcendence of Reference; Chapter 25 Introduction to Part IV; Chapter 26 Troubles for Naive Naturalism; Chapter 27 The Elusivity of Reference; Chapter 28 Causality and Reference; Chapter 29 Transcending Procedures; Chapter 30 Transcendence and its Discontents;