This book explains why British defence policy and practice emerged as it did in the period 1941-67, by looking at the overlapping of colonial, military, economic and Cold War factors in the area. Its main focus is on the 1950s and the decolonisation era, but it argues that the plans and conditions of this period can only be understood by tracing them back to their origins in the fall of Singapore. Also, it shows how decolonisation was shaped not just by British aims, but by the way communism, communalism and nationalism facilitated and frustrated these.

Karl Hack

Introduction; Chapter One: Frameworks; Chapter Two: 1942 and the 'Lessons' of Singapore 1; Chapter Three: Regional Ambitions and Limited Resources (1945-54); Chapter Four: A Bottomless Pit? Forces and Bases (1945-54); Chapter Five: 1954 and Continuity in the Face of Change; Chapter Six: SEATO and Regional Policy (1954-57); Chapter Seven: Merdeka and Bases (1954-57); Chapter Eight: Merdeka and Forces (1954-57); Chapter Nine: Epilogue: From Malayan Independence to British Withdrawal