During the early years of the Second World War, Britain devoted immense resources to building military bases in Egypt and Palestine. The political stability of the two countries was of prime concern to avoid diverting troops away from fighting the external enemy to internal security tasks. The paradox of Britain's eventual victory was that it could not perpetuate its political authority. Demands for independence intensified in Egypt and among Palestinian Jewry, and led to postwar struggles.

Martin Kolinsky is Senior Lecturer in the Department of Political Science and International Studies at the University of Birmingham.

Preface List of Abbreviations Introduction British Strategic Policy 1936-1938 Political Uncertainties in Egypt during the Interwar Period Palestine 1936-38: the Reshaping of British Policy The Policy of Appeasement: the White Paper on Palestine and Jewish Refugees British Strategic Policy 1939 - June 1940 Defence Issues in Egypt and Palestine 1939-1940 British Strategic Policy July 1940 - June 1941 British Intervention in Egyptian Politics Wartime Policy Towards Palestine Conclusion Notes Bibliography Index