In presenting the concepts and the logical structure of the reasoning offered by game theory and their applications, the book explains the rational process of decision making in the framework of firm management and market competition. The book will expose both general teachings and a comprehensive analysis applied to specific case studies of various sectors of the economy.
Autorentext
Nabyla DAIDJ, Teacher-Reasercher (PhD), Télécom Ecole de Management.
Abdelhakim HAMMOUDI, Researcher (PhD), Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique.
Inhalt
Introduction xi
Chapter 1. From Traditional Forms of Cooperation Toward New Collaborative Practices 1
1.1. Introduction 1
1.2. What is cooperation? 1
1.2.1. The object of cooperation 1
1.2.2. The actors 2
1.2.3. Products and services involved 3
1.2.4. Agreement duration 4
1.3. The traditional forms of cooperation 6
1.3.1. Traditional cooperation at large 6
1.3.2. Exclusions from a restrictive typology 7
1.3.3. Typology of agreements by stage of production 14
1.4. New collaborative practices or the emergence of new innovation forms 21
1.4.1. Multiplication of co- practices 21
1.4.2. Platforms 22
1.5. Conclusion 22
Chapter 2. Cooperation and Transaction Costs Theory 23
2.1. Introduction 23
2.2. The logics of transaction costs 23
2.2.1. Coase and the market costs 24
2.2.2. Developing the theory of transaction costs: Williamson 25
2.3. Alliance, market and hierarchy 29
2.3.1. The alliance, an intermediate form between market and hierarchy 29
2.3.2. The alliance, an alternative form to market and to hierarchy 33
2.4. Limitations of the contribution of transaction costs theory to the analysis of strategic alliances 37
2.4.1. Issues associated with transaction costs 38
2.5. Conclusion 41
Chapter 3. Cooperation, Open Innovation and Property Rights 43
3.1. Introduction 43
3.2. The patents contest 44
3.2.1. Overall view: the notable growth of patents 44
3.2.2. Patents and innovation: the theoretical economic debate 47
3.3. Property rights and firms 49
3.3.1. Definition and fundamental features of property rights 50
3.3.2. A contractual conception of the firm 50
3.4. Property rights, technological externalities and inter-firm alliances 53
3.4.1. Property rights imperfections and externalities 53
3.4.2. Alliances and internalization of technological externalities 55
3.5. Property rights and open innovation 61
3.5.1. Open-innovation strategies 61
3.5.2. Intellectual property challenges in open-innovation practices 63
3.6. Conclusion 65
Chapter 4. Agency Theory and Strategic Alliances 67
4.1. Introduction 67
4.2. Cooperation and conflict in agency theory 67
4.2.1. Contract and firm 68
4.2.2. Agency theory and cooperation agreements 73
4.3. Agency theory, an analytical frame 80
4.3.1. An analytical frame for strategic alliances? 81
4.3.2. Strategic alliances: relations between principals? 83
4.4. Conclusion 86
Chapter 5. Strategic Alliances in R&D and Market Power 87
5.1. Introduction 87
5.2. Entry barriers and strategic commitment 88
5.2.1. Barriers and game theory 88
5.3. Alliances and strategic barriers to entry 92
5.3.1. Alliances as a means of erecting (or overcoming) barriers to entry 93
5.3.2. Alliances and strategic barriers to entry and R&D 93
5.4. Technological lifecycle, entry conditions and strategic alliances 95
5.4.1. Technological lifecycle and entry conditions 95
5.4.2. Technological lifecycle and strategic alliances 100
5.5. Strategic deterrent power to entry and technological race 102
5.5.1. Competition versus race? 102
5.5.2. The race for innovation 104
5.5.3. The introduction of cooperative phenomena between firms 106
5.6. Strategic dissuasion to entry, alliances and patent race 109
5.6.1. Innovation preemption by a market monopolist 109
5.6.2. Patent preemption, entry conditions and joint-ventures 110
5.7. Conclusion 112
Chapter 6. From Cooperation to Coopetition 113