Are any of our beliefs justified? Are they rational? The skeptic thinks that our epistemic justifications are undeserved. Nicholas Nathan confronts the skeptic and questions the value of his argument.

Skeptical arguments are against justified and rational belief as well as for ignorance. Nathan argues that the truth value of trivial arguments are a matter of indifference. He tests this conjecture with a varied collection of counterexamples: arguments for ignorance, neo-Cartesian and infinite regress arguments, and also more critically with arguments against justified and rational belief.

Acknowledgements, Introduction, I Arguments for ignorance and the negation test, II Demonic arguments, III Regressive arguments, IV Evidence-or-acquaintance arguments, V Anti-idealism, VI Arguments against justified belief, VII From rational action to rational belief, VIII Arguments against rational belief, IX The affirmation test, Appendix: Semantic objections to demonic arguments, Notes, Works cited, Index