First published in 1991. This book initially offers a critique of some key rational public choice models, to show that they were internally inconsistent and ideologically slanted. Then due to the authors' research the ideas are restructured around a particular kind of institutional public choice method, recognizing the value of instrumental models as a mode of thinking clearly about the manifold complexities of political life.

Professor Patrick Dunleavy (Department of Government, London School of Economics and Political Science.)

1. Introduction: Institutional Public Choice Theory and Political Analysis
   DEMOCRACY
2. Interest Groups and Collective Action
3. Reconstructing the Theory of Groups
4. Economic Explanations of Voting Behaviour
5. Party Competition - The Preference-Shaping Model
   BUREAUCRACY
6. Existing Public Choice Models of Bureaucracy
7. The Bureau-Shaping Model
8. Comparing Budget - Maximizing and Bureau-Shaping Models
9. Conclusion - Economic Explanations in Political Science