This book provides a systematic reading of Martin Heidegger's project of "fundamental ontology," which he initially presented in Being and Time (1927) and developed further in his work on Kant. It shows our understanding of being to be that of a small set of a priori, temporally inflected, "categorial" forms that articulate what, how, and whether things can be.
As selves bound to and bounded by the world within which we seek to answer the question of how to live, we imaginatively generate these forms in order to open ourselves up to those intra-worldly entities which determinately instantiate them. This makes us, as selves, the source and unifying ground of being. But this ground is hidden from us - until we do fundamental ontology. In showing how Heidegger develops these ideas, the author challenges key elements of the anti-Cartesian framework that most readers bring to his texts, arguing that his Kantian account of being has its roots in the anti-empiricism and Augustinianism of Descartes, and that his project relies implicitly on an essentially Cartesian "meditational" method of reflective self-engagement that allows being to be brought to light. He also argues against the widespread tendency to see Heidegger as presenting the basic forms of being as in any way normative, from which he concludes, partially against Heidegger himself, that fundamental ontology is, while profound and worth pursuing for its own sake, inert with respect to the question of how to live.
The Bounds of Self will be of interest to researchers and advanced students working on Heidegger, Kant, phenomenology, and existential philosophy.
Autorentext
R. Matthew Shockey is Associate Professor and Chair of the Department of Philosophy at Indiana University - South Bend, USA
Inhalt
Introduction: Undertaking To Be 1
Being a Self 1
Four Questions 2
Heidegger's Kantian Cartesianism 6
Methodology 19
1 Being in Question 24
Being Forgotten 24
The Ontological Difference and the Articulated
Regionalization of Being 27
The Ontological and Ontical Priority of the Being-Question 30
Being and the Self: Pursuing Ontological 'Self-Transparency' 36
Conclusion 47
Table 2: The Basic Concepts of Fundamental Ontology 49
2 Outward Bounds - World and Others 50
World 50
World and Dasein 60
Presence-at-Hand, and Some Remarks on Method 65
Others 71
3 Inward Bounds I: Care as the Being of the Self 76
Overview 76
Being-in and Care 78
Understanding and Existence 79
Discourse and Falling 91
Self-finding and Facticity 98
Modes of Care 101
Summary 102
4 Inward Bounds II: Temporality as the Form of Care 105
Meaning and Time 105
Temporality and Selfhood 108
The Structure of Temporality 113
The Future 116
The Past 120
The Present 122
Summary and Discussion 124
5 Inward Bounds III: The Kantian Reinterpretation of Temporality 129
From Being and Time to Kant 129
Ontological Knowledge and Imagination 131
Imagination as/and Synthesis 137
3a The Synthesis of Apprehension in Intuition 137
3b The Synthesis of Reproduction in Imagination 139
3c The Synthesis of (P)recognition in a Concept 142
Ontological Creativity and the Nothing 147
6 Time and Being 151
Introduction 151
World, Others, and Self Revisited 152
Regions and their Unity 159
Inter-Regional Relations 166
Conclusion 174
7 The End of Ontology 176
The Bounds of Self 176
Doing Ontology - How? 179
Doing Ontology - Why? 188
Conclusion: Heideggerian Critique? 196