Game Theory: A Modeling Approach quickly moves readers through the fundamental ideas of the subject to enable them to engage in creative modeling projects based on game theoretic concepts.

The authors match conclusions to real-world scenarios and applications. The text engages students in active learning, group work, in-class discussions and interactive simulations.

Each chapter provides foundation pieces or adds more features to help readers build game theoretic models. The chapters include definitions, concepts and illustrative examples. The text will engage and challenge both undergraduate and graduate students.

Features:

• Enables readers to apply game theorty to real-world scenarios
• Chapters can be used for core course materials or independent stuides
• Exercises, included at the end of the chapters, follow the order of the sections in the text
• Select answers and solutions are found at the end of the book
• Solutions manual for instructors is available from the authors

Richard Alan Gillman is a mathematics professor at Valparaiso University.

David Housman teaches courses in applied mathematics and computer science at Goshen College.

This is an introductory game theory book that quickly moves readers through the fundamental ideas of game theory to enable them to engage in creative modeling projects based on game theoretic concepts. The book is linear, as the chapters are not independent. Readers should be able to build simple game theoretic models after chapter 3. Each subsequent chapter adds another feature to the reader's model-building repertoire.

1. Models and Games

INTRODUCTION TO MODELING

INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY

EXAMPLES OF GAMES

RATIONALITY ASSUMPTION

2. Player Preferences

ORDINAL UTILITIES

VON NEUMANNMORGENSTERN

UTILITIES

CONSTRUCTING UTILITIES

DETERMINING RISK

3. Simultaneous Play

STRATEGIC GAMES

FINAL JEOPARDY

MIXED STRATEGIES

NONMATRIX

MODELS

LIMITATIONS

4. Bilateral Agreements

NEGOTIATIONS

BARGAINING IN STRATEGIC GAMES

FAIRNESS PROPERTIES

5. Sequential Play

SEQUENTIAL GAMES

SUBGAME PERFECT EQUILIBRIA

COMBINATORIAL GAMES

MORAL HAZARD

6. Missing Information

IMPERFECT INFORMATION

ROMANS AND GERMANS

INCOMPLETE INFORMATION

BARGAINING GAMES WITH PRIVATE INFORMATION

INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATION

AUCTIONS

7. Repetitious Play

REPEATED SOCIAL DILEMMAS

MODELING NOISE

EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY

8. Multilateral Agreements

SHAPLEY ARGUMENT

NUCLEOLUS ARGUMENT

BARGAINING ARGUMENT

VOTING POWER

9. Resource Allocation

RESOURCE ALLOCATION PROBLEM

BARGAINING AND COALITION MODELS

COMPLETE AND INCOMPLETE INFORMATION MODELS

CONCLUDING REMARKS