This is an introductory game theory book that quickly moves readers through the fundamental ideas of game theory to enable them to engage in creative modeling projects based on game theoretic concepts.
Autorentext
Richard Alan Gillman is a mathematics professor at Valparaiso University.
David Housman teaches courses in applied mathematics and computer science at Goshen College.
Inhalt
- Models and Games
- Player Preferences
- Simultaneous Play
- Bilateral Agreements
- Sequential Play
- Missing Information
- Repetitious Play
- Multilateral Agreements
- Resource Allocation
INTRODUCTION TO MODELING
INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY
EXAMPLES OF GAMES
RATIONALITY ASSUMPTION
ORDINAL UTILITIES
VON NEUMANNMORGENSTERN
UTILITIES
CONSTRUCTING UTILITIES
DETERMINING RISK
STRATEGIC GAMES
FINAL JEOPARDY
MIXED STRATEGIES
NONMATRIX
MODELS
LIMITATIONS
NEGOTIATIONS
BARGAINING IN STRATEGIC GAMES
FAIRNESS PROPERTIES
SEQUENTIAL GAMES
SUBGAME PERFECT EQUILIBRIA
COMBINATORIAL GAMES
MORAL HAZARD
IMPERFECT INFORMATION
ROMANS AND GERMANS
INCOMPLETE INFORMATION
BARGAINING GAMES WITH PRIVATE INFORMATION
INTERNATIONAL COLLABORATION
AUCTIONS
REPEATED SOCIAL DILEMMAS
MODELING NOISE
EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY
SHAPLEY ARGUMENT
NUCLEOLUS ARGUMENT
BARGAINING ARGUMENT
VOTING POWER
RESOURCE ALLOCATION PROBLEM
BARGAINING AND COALITION MODELS
COMPLETE AND INCOMPLETE INFORMATION MODELS
CONCLUDING REMARKS