In order to determine whether two participants in a discussion are in real dis/agreement, one must compare their propositions. Comparison presupposes yardsticks in common. This work thematises such yardsticks, in that it demonstrates the existence, content and factual significance of a relatively well-delimited set of proposition types and proposition patterns, with their accompanying tenability criteria and motivating interests. It is for philosophers, legal theorists, lawyers, and linguists.

Preface to the English edition. Preface to the Norwegian edition. Some symbols and conventions used in the text. I. Introduction. II. Some Fundamental Types of Proposition about What something is. A. Survey. B. Definitions. C. Characterisations. D. Analytically Un/true Propositions. E. Separating. F. Fusion of Descriptive and Normative Propositions. The Concepts of 'Descriptive Proposition' and 'Normative Proposition' as Concepts of Degree. G. No Corresponding Fusion of Definitions and Characterisations. H. Interplay. III. Topics from the Assessment of Tenability. IV. Some Forms of Language and Argumentation that often Make it Unclear which Type of Proposition One is Confronted with; in Particular on the Flight from the Normative Proposition. V. Reconstruction and Redefinition: A Distinct and Widespread Combination of the Fundamental Proposition Types. Conclusion. Literature referred to. Index of authors. Index of subjects.