Viewing the behavior of NATO members through the prism of bargaining theory reveals them as states intent on obtaining the benefits of membership at the least cost to themselves. This book shows how NATO members use a variety of strategies and tactics to try to get the better of each other without wrecking an alliance that realizes their shared goals and from which they all benefit. The book examines: the original design of the alliance; patterns of bargaining during the Cold War and post-Cold War periods; how their rivalries impact members' domestic policies of defense and welfare; and what this history suggests about NATO's future prospects. Recent interventions in the Balkans and the Middle East make this virtually a playbook for following current events.

Wallace J. Thies

Chapter 1 Introduction; Chapter 2 An Argument Even Older Than the Alliance Itself; Chapter 3 The External Dimension (I); Chapter 4 The External Dimension (II); Chapter 5 The External Dimension (III); Chapter 6 The Internal Dimension (I); Chapter 7 The Internal Dimension (II); Chapter 8 Retrospect and Prospect;