Since 1993, Supreme Court precedent has asked judges to serve as gatekeepers to their expert witnesses, admitting only reliable scientific testimony. Lacking a strong background in science, however, some judges admit dubious scientific testimony packages by articulate practitioners, while others reject reliable evidence that is unreasonably portrayed as full of holes. Seeking a balance between undue deference and undeserved skepticism, Caudill and LaRue draw on the philosophy of science to help judges, juries, and advocates better understand its goals and limitations.

David S. Caudill is a professor of law at Washington & Lee University School of Law. He is the author of Property: Cases, Documents, and Lawyering Strategies (2004).

Lewis H. LaRue is also a professor of law at Washington & Lee University School of Law. He is the author of Constitutional Law as Fiction: Narrative in the Rhetoric of Authority (1995).

Chapter 1 Introduction
Chapter 2 1. What's the Problem?
Chapter 3 2. On Judges Who Are Too Strict
Chapter 4 3. On Judges Who Are Too Gullible
Chapter 5 4. The Idealizations of Legal Scholars
Chapter 6 5. Science is a Pragmatic Activity
Chapter 7 6. Science Studies for Law